After taking over front-line trenches at Bülow Farm (Langemarck) from the 6th York and Lancaster Regiment on 28th September, the 9th West Yorkshires appear to have had an uneventful tour until relieved by a battalion of another Brigade of the 11th Division on 2nd October. On 3rd October the West Yorkshiremen moved in buses to Houtkerque and were accommodated in tents, where several uncomfortable days were passed in refitting, re-organising, and in practising the attack for the forthcoming battle. On the 7th, buses arrived and carried the battalion to Siege Camp, whence a forward move was made to the front line, the 9th West Yorkshires relieving the 7th South Staffords.
The 9th West Yorkshires occupied the centre sub-sector of the 32nd Brigade front, having on the right the 6th York and Lancaster Regiment and on their left the 6th Yorkshire Regiment. The 8th Duke of Wellington's Regiment formed the Brigade Reserve. The line upon which the Brigade formed up for the attack ran approximately from just north of Terrier Farm in a north-westerly direction to a point on the road about 1,000 yards east of Lemnos House. The right boundary of the Brigade was roughly the right banks of the Lekkerboterbeek Stream.
The West Yorkshires were formed up for the attack on a two-company frontage " A " Company on the right, " B " on the left, with " C " Company on the right and " D " on the left in the second line; the average strength of companies was 100. The battalion frontage was about 600 yards. " A" Company's objective was Meunier House and the establishment of a line beyond; " B " Company was to establish a line running from V.20.a.9.9.— V.20.b.i.5 (a line facing north-east about half-way between Meunier House and Nobles Farm) and hold it as a Battalion Reserve against counterattack : " C " and " D " Companies were to pass through " A " and " B " and establish a line from V.i4.d.9.i. to V.2i.a.2.o.
In the September Diary of the 9th West Yorkshires there is an interesting note on the method of attack in which the battalion was trained when out of the line, and in view of the operations of 9th October it is not out of place to quote from the records in full: " The tactical training of platoons was modified to meet the recently adopted method of defence by the enemy. At present the German method of resistance is by isolated strong points, usually concrete buildings, containing one or more machine-guns. Artillery fire has very little effect on these, and the latest idea is to capture these strong points by platoons in their normal organisation, viz. : one section bombers, one section riflemen, one section Lewis gunners, one section rifle grenadiers. The platoons commenced to practise such attacks using all the weapons referred to . . . Concrete emplacements and strong points were attacked, the erections being improvised from canvas, etc., and poles. Emphasis was laid no the tactical use of the platoon weapons in attacking such places, and different formations were practised. The tendency is to advance in small columns instead of a succession of extended lines, as was adopted in the early part of the year, frontages became less and the attacking force is distributed in depth. Night dispositions were practised in stages : First, the approach march to a position ; second, forming up on tapes in the formation practised by day ; third, advancing from tapes to an objective."
" Zero hour on 9th October was 5-20 a m , when the British artillery barrage came down promptly on the enemy's front line and bis emplacements. But the ground was sodden, inches deep in mud and in an altogether appalling condition, so that many " HE." shells did not burst. The heavy rain of the previous day and night had turned No Man's Land into a veritable quagmire, and the Battalion Diary records that " the ground was churned up so as to be one endless mass of shell-holes ; mud and water was everywhere, and almost impassable."
The barrage was moving at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes as the West Yorkshiremen advanced, floundering through mud and filth, skirting the shell-holes where possible, though mostly having to " take " whatever came in the way in order to keep formation. Seven minutes after the British barrage opened the German barrage fell, but generally it was not very heavy. The British guns, however, literally plastered the enemy's trenches and emplacements with shell of all calibre, and the ordeal through which the Germans were passing must have been terrible ; indeed, the records speak of it as " terrific." Yet, through all that hell of bursting shell and storm of shrapnel the hostile " pill boxes " (or emplacements) stood practically unharmed and, as the British troops went forward, murderous machine-gun fire met their advance, for the machine-guns, safely ensconced in these " pill boxes," could not be silenced. Hostile cross-fire and traversing machine-gun fire swept the whole of the Divisional front, and the ranks of the attacking troops thinned very quickly.
The enemy had made good use of the ruins of Poelcappelle, concealing in them his riflemen and machine-gunners, who were able to fire in enfilade.
From the meagre details given in the Diary of the 9th West Yorkshires it is impossible to give details of the gallant efforts of the battalion to push on in spite of the fierce opposition met with, and the story (such as it is) of the attack given below is all the information available : " On our left flank the attack was held up at the The Brewery and after heavy casualties the 6th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment found themselves with both flanks ' in the air.' Very few officers were left in either the Yorkshire Regiment or our own battalion, and the lack of command began to have effect. On the left, the 6th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment was completely hung up and the remnants of the battalion fell back in the hope of reorganising. When our men saw this the news quickly spread that the 6th Yorkshires were retiring, and as the enemy had by this time parties almost in line with us on this front, some took up a position further back so as to preserve the general line and remain in touch with our flanks. Meanwhile, the attack had progressed with less resistance on the right and further headway would doubtless have been possible but for the stoppage in the centre and on the left. The only course open in view of heavy casualties, the serious resistance and the prospect of counter-attack in a few hours was to consolidate as far as possible and prepare to hold a line approximately to our assembly line. Every effort was made with this object in view and, to guard against any serious attempt to dislodge us from the position, the 6th Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment was brought into position between Pheasant Farm (Jungburg) and Retour Cross-roads.
But for the moment the battalion was safe from counter-attack, for from the statements made by prisoners taken it was evident that the enemy's losses had been very heavy, for a new division had taken over his front line on the previous night and the stoutness of his resistance had resulted in a heavy roll of casualties.
After the attack had come to a standstill and the assaulting battalions had consolidated their positions, numerous parties went out from both sides in order to collect the wounded and dead. For the time being both British and Germans refrained from firing on one another during this mournful task, and in one place the opposing troops were but thirty yards apart. As long as daylight lasted the work continued and when darkness fell the roll was called. Heavy, indeed, had been the losses of the 9th West Yorkshires—twelve officers and 203 other ranks being killed, wounded and missing.
On the night of 10th/11th October the battalion was relieved by the 7th Buffs, of the 18th Division and moved back to Irish Farm (Boezinge), entrained for Watten, marching thence to Zudrove, where the usual process of " cleaning-up" and reorganising after a battle was carried out, the battalion settling down afterwards to a period of training and " rest," before moving south to Noux-les-Mines on 23rd October.
The killed were : Capt. L. C. Kirk, Lieut. F. H. Evans and Second-Lieuts. R. A. Harris, B. Roberts, G. C. G. Grose and E. J. Woods. Lieut. E. S. Pyne died of wounds on 12th October.
Other ranks : Forty-seven killed, 113 wounded, forty-three missing.
Bron: The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War, 1914-1918 vol.II 1917; door Wyrall E.
