Most unfavourable conditions, therefore, faced the Eighteenth Division when early in October it returned to the Salient to continue the attack, and to add to the handicaps the Brigade was called upon to attack at 24 hours notice at a point quite different from that which it had expected to assault. The Division had been training to attack the main Passchendaele ridge and had carried out several tactical exercises over a model of the ground till all ranks were familiar with their tasks. Actually it had to attack Poelcapelle and, on the night of October 10th/11th, the 53rd Brigade moved up to the front to relieve the Eleventh Division at that point. That division had attacked Poelcapelle on October 8th, and after losing heavily had captured part of the village, but the Northern end of it along the Staden road had remained in German hands.
The relief, which pouring rain, mud that surpassed all previous experience, and intense darkness, rendered exceptionally slow and difficult, had barely been completed before the time fixed for the attack of" October 12th. The 7th R.W.K. were on the left of the 55th Brigade, next to the Fourth Division, with the Buffs on their other flank. The plan of attack involved the withdrawal of the companies holding the front line, A and D, to an assembly position some way further back, as the front line ran diagonally to the objectives. Detachments were left along the front line, with orders to rejoin their companies as these came along as the second wave of the attack. But the withdrawal lengthened the distance to be covered, a disadvantage the more serious because of the mud which retarded progress-it was so bad that in places men stuck fast and, being unable to move, were killed where they stood. Even the lightly equipped could hardly move in such a slough; for men encumbered with equipment, weapons and ammunition it was doubly difficult. Thus, though the enemy's barrage was not very effective, the battalion lost quite heavily from rifle and machine-gun fire before it cleared its own front line.
B Company, on the right, made fair progress at first and accounted for many enemy. Before long, however, they were held up by machine-gun fire from their right flank and from The Brewery, a strong point just East of the Staden road. All the officers became casualties, but Sergt. Tebbitt took command and carried on till, about 6.70 a.m., D reinforced the survivors of B. But even then the opposition was too strong to allow of much progress; casualties were heavy, and 2nd Lieut. Duffield, the only officer left with the two companies, re-organized them in a chain of posts just beyond the original line, and despite heavy fire maintained his ground successfully. (He was awarded the M.C.. while Sergt. Tebbitt received the M.M.)
On the other flank C had found the barrage somewhat erratic, indeed several German machine-guns had escaped it and gave a great deal of trouble. The platoon on the flank, however, got on splendidly. When a machine-gun in a strong point threatened to hold it up, Pte. Ives rushed forward with a Lewis gun, and despite heavy fire knocked the machine-gun out, enabling the platoon to get on. Sergt. Hamblin, who had taken command on the fall of his officer, 2nd Lieut. Michell, led the platoon with so much determination and ability that it reached a strong point only just short of the battalion's objective and well ahead of the rest of the attack. This point it rushed successfully, capturing two officers and 50 men with a couple of machine-guns. From here the party, reduced by casualties to 16 men, became mixed up with the Household Battalion of the Fourth Division with whom they pushed on ahead.
The rest of C were less fortunate. A strong point at the Northern end of the village brought them to a standstill, and though A came up to reinforce it was unable to carry the advance any further, nor could the 8th Suffolk of the 53rd Brigade achieve any more when they, too, pushed forward on the left. Finally, therefore, these two companies dug in a little in front of the line held before the attack. Touch was established with Lieut. Duffield's party and eventually some 120 men were collected and organised, a defensive flank formed on the right and the position consolidated, despite much trouble from snipers. Sergt. Coleman helped greatly in this work, he went up and down the line under heavy fire, encouraging the men and directing their efforts. Sergts. Coombs and Firmer were also well to the fore, but despite the gallantry and determination which the 7th had displayed it had achieved but little to compensate for very heavy losses. The weakness of the barrage (This was largely due to mud, owing to which many of the guns which should have provided it had stuck fast, and never got into action.) and the great difficulties of getting forward over a water-logged stretch of mud there had been no time to reconnoitre were mainly responsible for the failure to accomplish more, but the battalion hung on all through the next day (October 13th) and maintained its ground until that evening it was relieved by the 8th Suffolks.
But its cup was not yet full. When boarding lorries next day to withdraw to the back area, it had the misfortune to be attacked by German aeroplanes, an experience which was becoming unpleasantly frequent, and suffered nearly 40 casualties in addition to those already iricurred. These had been serious enough, just half the 600 men who had gone "over the top " were on the casualty list, along with 14 officers, of whom Captain Lewin, Lieut. H. T. Gregory, 2nd Lieuts. Allen, Coles and Michell were killed or died of wounds, Captains Anstruther and F. H. F. Smith being among the wounded (Of the officers who had taken part in the attack, Colonel Cinnamond and Lieut. Duffield were the only two unhurt.) To these the bombing attack added Lieut. Gladwell killed, Captain Heaton, died of wounds, and Captain Hogg and 2nd Lieut. Day wounded. It was a sadly shattered remnant that was left of a battalion which had come up to the front in fine condition and fighting trim (Captain Reynolds, R.A.M.C., the Medical Officer of the Battalion, had done exceptionally fine work during this attack. His name was sent up with a strong recommendation for the D.S.O., but to the disappointment of all ranks he was only awarded the M.C.)
Bron: The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1914-1919; door Atkinson C.
