On the 23rd September the Buffs moved by train to St. Jan Ter Biezen, where, five days afterwards hostile aircraft dropped bombs into the camp, doing a very great deal of damage. The men were in huts and tents and the area a very congested one, which fact probably tempted the enemy to bis enterprise. It was dark when the aeroplane flew over and it dropped six bombs (two of which were blind) right into the camp, resulting in the death of 2nd Lieut. R. E. C. Mead and twenty-six men and the wounding of Lieut, and Qr.-Master Rye, 2nd Lieuts. Malton and Tyler and sixty-three others. This misfortune had the effect of disorganizing the arrangement of platoons and sections just at a time when the regiment was being braced up and perfected in the new method of attack called "Leap-frog." However, the training still went on and, moving by stages, the battalion, with the rest of the brigade, was on the 11th October opposite the village of Poelcappelle, because for various reasons, one of which was a desire to assist the French, our Commander-in-Chief was arranging a considerable offensive movement before the weather, which had been much against movement, got absolutely too wet and wintry for any kind of manœuvre.
This offensive operation was made over a six-mile front northwards from a point east of the village of Zonnebeke and so brought the 55th Brigade to the position indicated. As far as the 55th Brigade was concerned no circumstances could have been less in favour of a successful attack, for several reasons : no shelter was to be had for the assaulting troops, who had to be out in the open, in mud and rain, close up to the front line and in full view of hostile aircraft, thus advertising the coming movement, so to speak; much detail in the way of attack orders was altered and amended at the last moment, and these details consequently could not be made known to everyone in time, for the night of the 11th was pitch dark and the various platoons and sections were scattered about wherever cover could be got—in shell holes and the like, and so had no chance of receiving detailed orders. The Buffs line was from Gloster Farm, to Poelcappelle Church; C Company was on the right and D on the left, A supporting C and B behind D. The objective, together with the battalion area of activity, is shown on the accompanying sketch map. A and B Companies were to act as what was known as " leapfrog " companies—that is, they were to pass the others and go on to the second objective. All companies were in position by 4 a.m. on the 12th October; outposts were withdrawn at 5.15; the barrage opened at 5.25, and C and D moved forward.
All reports agree in stating that our barrage was not a success; it was erratic and not heavy enough, and when the infantry attack was getting into difficulties it passed too far ahead. The officer commanding C Company (Captain Nicholson) reported that the guns opened thirty seconds too late on his front, that the barrage commenced very thinly and thickened right on top of the leading troops. D Company got caught by the enemy's gun fire as it was waiting for ours to lift and the whole front line came immediately under very heavy fire, particularly C, which suffered much from machine guns from the neighbourhood of Gloster Farm and from point " 37." D Company got through the houses and enclosures which were on its front, but, on emerging, met heavy cross machine-gun fire from Meunier House and The Brewery, and thus our attack was checked throughout our line. A and B, moving up in rear so as to keep close, came in their turn under intense machine-gun fire, B Company especially suffering very severely. These supports were eventually merged into the leading line and every effort was made to struggle forward, but the heavy ground prevented anything but laborious movement which was ill suited to a rain of bullets, and at last things came to a standstill.
C Company managed to rush one hostile post, where the men captured a machine gun and turned it very effectually on its late owners. Captain Nicholson, M.C., who commanded C Company, tried to dig in where he was, but the ground was terribly swampy for this; however, he was, about noon, able to report a perceptible slackening of the enemy's fire. About this time he noticed 2nd Lieut. Knisrht with the elements of A Company about four hundred yards to his right, and he sent off 2nd Lieut. H. M. Spencer to get touch with him with a view to together making an attempt to gain ground; Spencer, on his way, fell, mortally wounded, and Nicholson went out to help him. As he was doing so he heard a shout and saw that Knight and about thirty men had been overwhelmed and made prisoners. He could not get back to his men in time to order them to open fire. This affair caused a gap on Nicholson's left and he directed his remaining officer, 2nd Lieut. Tupper, to form three posts to protect that flank while he himself established five others on his front. He then attempted to consolidate these, but the state of the ground prohibited digging. About 2 p.m. a party of Germans was observed near The Brewery advancing down the main street of Poelcappelle which had every appearance of a counter-attack and preparations were made accordingly, but the enemy was successfully stopped by parties of the West Kent and of the Suffolk Regiment which were in the village. About 5.30 the enemy shelled our lines and the village, but defensive posts were established and all was well, though the bombardment continued during the next day, the 13th, and at dusk the remnant of the Buffs withdrew to Counter Farm (Langemarck) on relief by the 7th Battalion of the Queen's.
It is worthy of note that on the 12th and 13th both the Germans arid ourselves were able to attend the wounded by flying a white or Red Cross flag, white handkerchief or rag. The enemy never fired on a wounded man. It is eloquent of the state of things during a war between so-called civilized nations that such should be considered as exceptional.
The Buffs casualties in this action were: killed, Captain E. B. C. Burnside, 2nd Lieuts. R. W, Bone, H. M. Spencer and H. Thomas and 52 other ranks; wounded, Captains Blood-Smyth and West, Lieut. Boner, 2nd Lieuts. Amos and Bull, and 178 men; missing, 2nd Lieut. Knight and 145 men. A Company had left at duty one sergeant and one corporal; B, one corporal; C, two sergeants and four corporals; and D, one sergeant and one corporal—no less than 62 N.C.O.'s being amongst the casualties. As has been seen, several circumstances contributed to prevent this action from being an entire success, but the chief was the deplorable state of the ground, which prevented movement and consolidation and which, worst of all, prevented fire, by clogging up the men's rifles with mud.
On the 24th of the month the battalion went into billets at Poperinghe, where nine men got M.M.'s. On the 1st November it moved, by means of lorries, to Parroy Camp, where it worked on the roads. On that day a second bar to Captain C. D. Hayfield's M.C. was announced, as well as one to Captain A. C. L. Nicholson's. The M.C. was awarded to 2nd Lieut. Tupper, the D.C.M. to C.Q.M.S. Burt and Sgt. Pellandine, and the M.M. to ten more of the men.
Bron: Historical records of the Buffs, East Kent Regiment; door Moody R.
