From 1st to 5th October the battalion was at Roussel Farm, Elverdinghe; and on three of those days, seven officers and all available men had to march six miles to the forward area, work till midnight or later in preparation for the impending attack and march six miles back again to their camp. On 5th October, the battalion moved to Wolfe Camp, also near Elverdinghe, where a draft of 100 N.C.Os. and men joined. This brought the total strength to 34 officers and 924 other ranks, of whom 21 officers and 480 other ranks went up to the line on 7th October, while 3 officers and 107 N.C.Os. and men stayed in the transport lines as "battle reserve". The remainder were on leave (20), in hospital (38), on courses (18), attached to a field ambulance as stretchers bearers (15), employed with an engineer working party (26), or detached for duty with such varied units and officers as the divisional canteen, the XlVth Corps Burial Officer, the divisional band, 11th and 12th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and 4th Divisional Headquarters, the Area Commandant a; Proven (who absorbed four men) and a rest camp.
lt is small wonder therefore that each company consisted of three platoons instead of the normal four. The weather broke on 5th October, but the rain stopped just before the battalion moved off on 7th October to relieve the 1st Hampshire Regiment in the line close to the western edge of Poelcappelle, so that a fine day was enjoyed on the 8th with a good, drying breeze. Unfortunately, towards the evening of that day, rain came down again and made the final preparations almost as difficult as they were for the 1st Battalion. During the night of 8th/9th, tapes were put out by the Royal Engineers, and the companies formed up between 1 a.m. and 3 a.m., all being ready by 3.20 a.m. Company (Second-Lieutenant C. U. Lloyd) was on the right and "C" Company (Captain J. Judd) on the left, with Company(Captain G. L. Elkington) and "D" Company (Lieutenant A. D.Macdonald, M.C.) in support. One platoon of Company an done of "D" were detailed as "moppers-up" for and "C" Companies respectively. The battalions first and second objectives were a continuation in a south-easterly direction of those laid down for the 1st Battalion; but it had a third objective about sevenhundred yards beyond its second. At 5 a.m. Major Watkins and his headquarters moved up to 19 Metre Hill, within a few yards of the front line, so as to be close to the attacking waves with which they moved forward a position maintained throughout the greater part of the attack. Twenty minutes later the attack. began, under cover of a thick barrage provided by a great variety of guns ranging from I8 pounders to 9.2. howitzers. The German barrage came down on the support line three minutes after the attack started and caused the support battalion to move up rather too fast and to become mingled with the rear waves of the and Battalion. But the attacking troops reached their first objective up to time at 5.45 a.m. and with very few casualties. As one officer put it, for the first five or six minutes, it was like a practice attack on parade." The difficulties began as the advance towards the second objective started and particularly when the light railway running alongside the Poelcappelle-Houthulst Forest road was reached. The division on the right had been held up in the ruïns of Poelcappelle and consequently German machine guns were still able to fire down this road from the north-west end of the village. There were also a number of snipers who had escaped the barrage and who were very active near Landing Farm and Compromis Farm (both north of Poelcappelle) and from Millers House, on the dividing line between the 1st Lancashire Fus. (29th Division on the left) and 2nd Lancashire Fus.. It was from the Houses that the first serious check came, with the result that the barrage was lost and, when the troops were finally able to cross the main. road, they were no longer protected by the artillery but had to jump from shell-hole to shell-hole.
By 10.30 a.m. only six officers were left with the companies, "B"company having none, and the casualties had been about 120. When Major Watkins realized the position, he and his intelligence officer (Captain S. Clarke) at once went to the most forward positions and began to reorganize the troops a process which was badly needed as men from the 2nd Duke of Wellington’s, the 1st Kings-Own, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and other units had become mixed with the 2nd Battalion. Moreover, owing to the appalling state of the ground which had been cut to pieces by shell hole, it was almost impossible for any officer or N.C.O. to handle more than half a dozen men. Watkins and Clarke, however, succeeded in collecting a party of various regiments with a view to an attack 0n Millers House. Detachments went round both Hanks, co-operating on the left with same men of the 1st Lancashire Fus.. The fate of the garrison of this trouble some place was sealed by Serjeant C. Watch, who took three men and rushed a machine gun which had been holding up the advance, put it out of action, and induced the garrison of two officers and some thirty Germans to surrender at about 11 a.m. Watkins’s action had cleared the path for a further advance but owing to the condition of the ground, to heavy shell hole and te continuous sniping, he was unable to reach the advancing companies or to influence their action further. He saw the enemy massing for a counter-attack near Senegal Farm, 0n the 1st Lancashire Fus. front, but was powerless to help. The advance towards the second objective was very slow. Judddis played great gallantry and initiative in rallying parties of men and leading them forward from one shell hole to another as far as he could. Serjeant VV. Sidlew and Corporal Ii. G. Deeley both showed pluck and determination in rushing enemy posts and, between them, taking a number of prisoners. But by noon it had become evident that the attack had, through no fault of the troops, lost its momentum; and Major Watkins ordered the leading troops to dig in where they were. They had managed to reach a position half-way between the first and second objectives and had advanced about four hundred yards en the right and six hundred yards en the left, where touch was gained with Le Mesuriers party of the 1st Lancashire Fus. under the supervision of Clarke, who performed most useful work in organizing a line of posts under heavy sniping fire. Serjeant Watkin’s adventures were not yet over, however. When the stand fast order was given, he and his party found themselves in the enemy’s lines and had the unpleasant sensation of experiencing the nature of the British barrage which was put down to cover the consolidation of the position which had been gained. Nevertheless, as by a mirade they survived and succeeded in making their way back to the battalion’s lines. The credit for the safe delivery of the order to consolidation was due mainly to Corporal E. Steckten, who through out the day carried messages from battalion headquarters to the companies in spite of heavy fire and of all the difficulties which have been described.
Never once did he fail to deliver a message to the right quarters, a very fine achievement when company headquarters were in unmarked shell holes and nobody could be expected to know their where about or direct a runner to them. Stockton was also very useful later in the operation in guiding ration parties from the rear to the troops in the line. Corporal T. Lancashire, the medical officers assistant, seemed to bear a charmed life as he walked about in search of wounded, quite indifferent to all bullets. The battalion spent the night of 9th/10th October in the positions it had won. The conditions were very bad. The shell holes were half filled with water, the men had no cover and it was bitterly cold. Fortunately the depression spread to both sides and there was no activity during the night. But the casualties had not ended. At about 2 am. Major Watkins was hit by a stray bullet through the right arm and had to leave his headquarters, though he was back again with the battalion within a fortnight. The adjutant., Captain G. C. Martin, M.C., assumed command, but four hours later he was hit by a piece of shrapnel and was compelled to go to hospital. Clarke then took command, with second-Lieutenant R. Gilmour as his adjutant. There were no counter—attacks during 10th October, but German snipers were very active. The battalion was relieved that night and it was due to Clarke’s personal initiative and energy that the process was carried out without a hitch. The troops had been amazingly cheerful throughout the operation and were in good heart when they reached Redan Camp, near Brielen, early on 11th October. At 5 p.m. next day the battalion entrained at Elverdinghe and detrained two hours later at Proven, whence they marched to what one officer described as "probably the muddiest camp the battalion. had ever been in."The medical officer, Captain C. R.. R. Hux table, M.C., had once more shown a complete disregard of his personal safety in the discharge of his duties, and he was awarded a bar to his decoration Captains S. Clarke and J. Judd received the Military Cross, while the Distinguished Conduct Medal was given to Serjeants C. A.Watch and VV. Sidlow and to Corporals F. G. Deeley and Stockton.The good work of the following was recognized by the grant of the Military Medal :
Serjeant W. Evans; Serjeant G.B.A. Lawes.; Serjeant J. Leonard. ; Serjeant J.Shaw. ; Corporal T. Lancashire. ; Corporal F. Nicholson. ; Private R. Ainscow.; Private J.H. Booth.; Private C. Breen. ; Private H.W. Gaby.; Pirvate A Davies.; Private D Jones.; Private G Hobden.; Private J. Liles.; Private C.Kirk.; Private.J.A. prior.
In addition, Lance-Corporal G. Brown, M.M., a stretcher-bearer, was awarded a bar to the Military Medal. The battalions casualties were 3 officers and 33 other ranks killed, 8 officers and 126 other ranks wounded and 1 officer and 41 other ranks missing.
The 2nd Battalion was concerned with an ill-fated raid at Monchy le Preux in the middle of November.
Bron: The history of the Lancashire Fusiliers 1914-1918 Vol.II; door Latter J.
