The great battle in Flanders had already lasted for two months. It had begun on July 31st, after at tremen-dous bombardment of the German lines for nine days and nights. Almost on the eve of the attack the enemy had abandoned the line of the Yser Canal and his ruined front trenches before Ypres, and the first day’s lighting had secured an advance of from 1,000 to 3,000 yards in depth on a front of nearly fifteen miles. Instead of the sharp and dangerous salient, we now had a new front on a long flatly curving line, with a footing on the high ground the enemy had held for years. lt was a success that seemed to presage the reconquest of Western Belgium. But on this first day of the advance the fine weather abruptly ended, and a persistent deluge of rain began that lasted all through August. There was slightly better weather in September, but the downpour began again in October. Under these conditions, with even the higher ground deep in mud and the wide flats between the hills and the water-line of the Yser converted into a morass, progress became a slow and costly business. There were days of battle when another step forward was made, and a narrow zone was won on ground where all ordinary features had disappeared. in a tangle of water-logged shell holes, with the streams and drainage channels blocked here and there with debris and spreading into wide pools and deep swamps. The tanks had been helpful on the first day. After that they were helpless, and many of them came to such swift disaster that: there was some peril of the new arm being permanently discredited. Our men were lighting their way forward step by step against the lines of wired defences full of strong points of a new type—concrete machine gun nests, the little forts that our men knew as "pill-boxes," and ruined buildings concreted into improvised fortresses. Both sides in this long battle in the new swamps of Flanders suffered endless misery and losses that finally exceeded even the terrible total of the Somme. By the end of September the original plan of the capture of the Ypres ridges being only the prelude to a joint naval and military attack on the German coast fortresses from Ostend to Zeebrugge, and a push for Bruges and Ghent, had been abandoned, and the objective was the winning of the Passchendaele Ridge and a line allong the lower undulations of the ground south of Houthulst Forest. For the left of our advance this meant pushing onward over the water-logged and cratered flats on both sides of the railways that run north-east from Ypres to Staden and Roulers.
When the 17th Division reached Flanders, in the first days of October, the 14th. Corps, under Lord Cavan, formed the extreme left of the British line, next to the sector where the French contingent was operating. Lord Cavan had the 29th Division astride of the Ypres—Bruges-Staden railway near the road that runs north from Poelcappelle to Houthulst Forest, with the Guards Division facing the margin of the Forest north of the line on the left, and the 4th Division on the right. The 17th Division was presently to relieve the 29th in the centre. When the Division was withdrawn from the Arras front in September it was greatly reduced in strength. Several of its battalions had only go per cent of their full numbers and every one was more or less short of its full war establishment. At during the summer and early autumn this front east of Arras had been classed as “ a quiet sector,” and little or nothing had been done to make up for wastage of trench warfare. The anxious time was beginning when the problem of man—power was by no means an easy one. It was not only that besides re-cruiting for the army, a huge navy had to be kept manned, and workers provided for mine and factory and munition works, but besides this, if we take into account our commitments in the various " side shows " that had developed since 1914, it might be said that land forces were being maintained not for one but for several wars. Then there was the great army maintained at home, and the numbers of officers and men necessarily employed in various subsidiary but essential services behind the Western Front. It is no wonder that " quiet sectors " were in danger of being starved of a due allowance of reinforcing drafts. As the Division moved up to Flanders, and during the few days before it went into the line, there was a hurried and belated enfort to make up at least some part of its wastage. The experience of one battalion the 7th Lincolns may be taken as typical. They came out of the trenches before Greenland Hill with a strength reduced to about 450 of all ranks. On the way north, and during the few days at Herzeele before going into the line and into action, the battalion received drafts amounting in all to 275 men, bringing its strength up to a little over 7oo. The new arrivals were all men of middle age, " combed out " by the Q.M.G. from detachments doing duty on the Lines of Communication., and from Kite Sections, etc. Before being sent off in the draft, numbers of them had been given such hasty musketry instruction as they could gain from firing some twenty rounds on at miniature range at the Base. They were keen enough, and their goodwill was worthy of all praise, but by no stretch of the imagination could they be classed as " trained soldiers." They learned something by working and drilling with the older hands at Herzeele, and every opportunity was taken for special training and lectures by the Company officers. Particular emphasis was laid upon the necessity of keeping close up to our creeping barrage, and their conduct in action showed they had grasped the lesson that; this gave the best chance of getting through safely and successfully. The training of the 51st Brigade at Herzeele was shortened to three days. On October 8th it began its march back to take over the new front, and next day the machine gunners of the 17th Division began relieving those of the 29th. The relief was completed in the night between the 10th and 11th, and on the morning of the 11the the 17th Division held the sector, with one Brigade in the front line, the other two in support and reserve and its Divisional Artillery covering the ground in front. Divisional Headquarters were moved that morning from Proven Central Camp to the chateau of Elverdinghe, near the starting point of the light railway system on the west side of the Yser Canal. Orders had been issued for a new advance of the British left next day —-Friday, October 12th——with zero hour at 5.25 a.m. in the autumn twilight about half an hour before sunrise. There had been heavy rain on the 10th. Next day there were some signs of better weather, but on that Thursday evening the sky was packed with heavy low—lying clouds, and as the troops moved into their assembly stations there began a downpour of cold rain that lasted for hours. The night was pitch dark, and the rain helped to conceal from the enemy the preparations for our attack. On the front held by the 51st Brigade these took at new form that entailed some risk, but as the event proved it was a risk that under the circumstances was worth taking, and the bad weather probably helped to its success. There was no regular trench system on the front held by the Division, this front line being nothing but strings of shell-holes protected by a very incomplete stretch of wire. Its total length was about 1,600 yards, astride of the Ypres-Staden railway, and extending about 500 yards to the north of it. On its extreme left it linked up with the Guards Division, the front of which formed an obtuse angle with its line, the Guards facing north towards the outskirts of Houthulst Forest and forming a defensive flank to the position held by the 14th Corps. On the right of the 17th Division, the 4th prolonged the front to near the ruins of Poelcappelle.
In this stage of the Flanders Battle fixed and limited objectives were assigned for each advance. There was no attempt to push on to any considerable depth ; what was aimed at was a moderate gain on the front, and when the further boundary line of the captured zone was reached there was a halt for the time being to consolidate (so far as consolidation was possible on this semi-fluid ground), and begin preparations for another forward step, a few days later. -Action of October 12, 1917- The objectives assigned to the 51st Brigade would mean the pushing back of the enemy’s front for about 600 yards in two successive bounds, each of about half this depth. The two lines to be reached by the assault were defined only by co-ordinates on the squared map, for in this flat war-wasted tract of ground on the Brigade front there no dominant or prominent features to be assigned to the first and second objectives.
The ground over which the advance was to be made was a waste of mud, createred with shell holes, with wide pools along the line of the flooded Broembeek, south of the railway; ruined farm-buildings here and there converted into strong points; concrete pill-boxes, and lines of shell-holes organised as a substitute for trenches. The difficulty of movement across such ground may be judged from the fact that the creeping barrage covering the advance was to move forward at the rate of only a hundred yards in ten minutes. The Corps artillery was to put down lines of barrage on the communications of the enemy's front.
The 8th Staffords were to attack on the left, north of the railway, the 7th Lincolns in the centre immediately south of it, and the 10th Sherwood Foresters on the right, where the 7th Borders were to follow in close support. Of course there could be no question of preparing assembly trenches. A line of shell holes was the front from which the attack would start, but a novel plan was adopted, and after dark, covered by patrols in No Man's Land, tape lines were laid out, on which the battalions were to assemble in advance of the front. In dense darkness, under a steady downpour the battalions massed in close order on these lines. They were to open out into successive waves for the attack in the first stage of the advance, and it was hoped- and the hope was realised- that quickly as the German barrage might come down, most of the assaulting battalions would be out in front of it by the time its descent began. If this massed assembly were discovered by the enemy before zero hour it would have drawn a destructive fire under conditions that would have made swift and serious losses inevitable. But the absolute silence of the men, the mud that muffled every footfall, the torrent of rain that intensified the darkness, and the careful patrolling out in front, all combined to conceal the situation to the last moment. An enemy patrol of seven men was encountered, in front of the Brigade centre and close up to it, but they were all bayonetted without one escaping to give the alarm. In the twilight at 5.25 a.m. our barrage opened and the advance began. The enemy`s barrage was slow in opening and somewhat irregular. On the Divisional front it mostly came down along the Poelcappelle- Houthulst road, and the advancing battalions almost entirely escaped it. What few losses there were, were mostly in keeping close to our own barrage. But the Germans opened a heavy machine gun fire, and on the left the Staffords were caught badly in it and had many casualties at the very outset, including several of their officers. They slightly lost direction, getting out of touch with the nearest Guards Battalion on their left, and crowding to their right. This left a post of the enemy for awhile immune from attack, and the machine guns installed there were bring into the right rear of the Guards after the first objective was won. This was for the 51st Brigade a line running at right angles across the railway, east of the road, and crossing south of the railway line the swampy course of two streams, the Broembeek and the Watervlietbeek. To reach it several strong points established in ruined buildings had to be dealt with. By eight o’clock the whole objective on the Brigade front had been won. The enemy put up a good fight at most points, and reinforcements were rushed up to support the defence. According to the accounts of prisoners these suffered considerable loss in coming through our heavy barrages. On the right, the 4th Division made slower progress, coming under a cross fire from Poelcappelle, and a defensive flank had to be formed on this side. ln the centre, one of the strong points was passed without being explored and " mopped up " the result apparently of the garrison, dazed by our shellfire, having themselves ceased firing, and our men, in their eagerness to get forward, missing it. Its capture was a curious incident. Major Peddie, D.S.O., of the Lincolns, the Signalling Officer, Captain King, and an orderly carrying a basket of messenger pigeons, were following up the advance when, as they approached the concreted ruin, a crowd of Germans came streaming out of it. There was however no fight in them, and many of them were in a pitiable condition on the verge of complete shell shock. They were apparently the garrison of the strong point plus a number of fugitives who had taken cover there. The three Lincolns were unarmed, for the orderly had lost his rifle when he slipped into a Hooded shell hole on the way up and thought only of saving his pigeons; the Major had left his pistol at Battalion and the Signalling Officer, though he wore a revolver, had no cartridges. But the Germans were anxious only to surrender and they were sent back in charge of the orderly, some 90 in all being thus captured.
The orderly summed up the situation by saying: " The Bosches came out of their pill—box, and we had nothing to shoot them with but a basket of blinking pigeons." By 11 a.m. the second and final objective was won-up to timetable. The right of the Brigade was now at the apex of a sharp salient at Memling Farm, the result of the advance of the 4th Division on this side being delayed and partly held up. Two companies of the Borders had been pushed in here to prevent a dangerous gap. From Memling Farm the new front ran back at an angle to Requete Farm near Poelcappelle. Such consolidation as was possible was now begun. The Germans did not even attempt a counter-attack, and in front of the Brigade all that could be seen of them was a confused group along the hollow of Watervlietbeek, out of which they were shelled by our gunners. Here and there groups held on in shell holes out in front, and there was some desultory firing during the afternoon. But by noon the battle was over. Poelcappelle had been cleared by the Division attacking south of the Corps front, and that flank was now secure. The Brigade took 218 prisoners (nine of them officers). They belonged to thirteen different battalions. The captures included also an abandoned field gun and four machine guns. Such a good supply of ammunition was taken with these that they were mounted and in action on our new front next day. lt was a very satisfactory morning’s work, all the more because an attack over the same ground had failed with heavy loss not many days before. General Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, telegraphed in the evening to General Robertson: " Well done everybody. Wonderful performance in awful conditions. Hearty congratulations to you and all your great troops." The line won that day by the 17th Division represented the furthest advance made on this Hank during the operations of this autumn in Belgium. A little further east on the higher ground of the Passchendaele Ridge the push was continued until the first fortnight of November, but under the " awful conditions " prevailing on the lower lands it was decided, after the fight of October 12th, that further progress was for the time being out of the question-this although a few days before staff maps had been marked with the lines for further objectives that were to include finally the capture of the enemy's rail- heads about Schaapbalie. The whole campaign in Flanders was being smothered in mud and brought to a dead stop like Napoleon’s operations in East Prussia in the winter after Jena, when he said that he had discovered that besides earth, air, fire and water there was sometimes a fifth element to be reckoned with in war, and that was mud. Arrangements were therefore made for holding the ground that had been won, through the coming winter. It was decided to modify the line so as to get rid of the sharp salient at Memling Farm, and a new alignment was marked out and occupied by a slight withdrawal of part of the front. The Division took over the front on its right flank up to the outskirts of Poelcapelle and handed over to the Guards Division its left Front north ot and including the Ypres-Staden railway, which became a well defined Divisional boundary on that side.
Two battalions held the new front, with a picket and support line established in shell holes, and tour strong posts in the rear of these east of the Poelcappelle-Houthulst road. West of the road the reserve companies were given some improvised shelter and the Battalion H.Q.s were installed here.
Weather conditions made it impossible to keep the men in the front line for more than a few days at a time, and in the posts of the picket and support line the stay was limited to two days. So great was the difficulty of bringing up supplies that the men occupying these points brought their two days rations with them. The lines of communication were not trenches, but were duck board tracks on the ground level through a wide expanse of mud, and running between the margins of shell craters. The enemy’s aircraft and artillery were very active. The German airmen marked the tracks and the gunners kept them under intermittent fire. New tracks were made as alternatives to minimise danger and loss, but it was impossible to conceal them. The movement along these narrow lines was always risky, and a stumble in the dark might mean death. Men were drowned, or rather sufliocated in the deep mud of the shell craters. Others were half-buried in them, and sometimes not discovered till daylight, when it was sometimes a difficult business to extricate them. There were cases of men sunk above the waist line, who could be rescued only by taking the risk of putting a rope round them, and dragging them out by main force. The rainy nights were intensely cold. Leather jackets were provided for some of the guards of the picket and support line, but there were not enough for all. Even with shortened tours of duty and every effort to provide abundant rations and warm clothing, the sick list rose steadily and each twenty—four hours had its casualty list from the shell fire of the enemy artillery and the day and night bombing of his aircraft.
ln the earlier days of this trying time on the Flanders front the Division was visited by a distinguished officer of the American Army, General O'Ryan, U.S.A., commanding the 27th (New York) Division. (Before the end of the war he rose to be first a Corps and then an Army Commander.) With some of his staff officers he was the guest of General Robertson at Elverdinghe Chateau, saw the troops both on parade and in the line, and made a careful study of our army methods. At the end of the month he wrote to the G.O.C.:
Hotel De Crillon, Paris. 29th October, 1917
My dear General Robertson,
After leaving you at Elverdinghe we were for a time with the 31st Division in the vicinity of Arras, and for the past ten days were with the French during the attack north-east of Soissons. General, i want you to know that we appreciate very much indeed the manner in which you received us and made us feel part of you. Our experiences with your army were most instructive, and I am sure we shall find them profitable in the future. I hope to have you visit my division, which is the New York Division (27th), after it arrives here and gets settled. Be assured of a warm welcome.
Sincerely yours,John F.O'Ryan, Major-General U.S.Army.
To Marjor-General P.R, Robertson, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding 17th Division, B.E.F.
On the night of October 13th/14th the 50th Brigade, which had been in support about Langemarck and Pilkem, relieved the 51st, which went into reserve near Elverdinghe, the 52nd moving up into the support position. On the night of the 16th/17th the 57th Division took over the sector. The H.Q. of the 17th Division were transferred to Proven Central Camp, where there was rest for a few days, and then a move on the 20th to the Recques training area west of St.Omer. Two days after reaching the training area, the 51st Brigade was suddenly ordered back to Proven as Corps Reserve, and entrained at very short notice. On reaching Proven it was ordered to take over the front held by the 35th Brigade, north of the Ypres-Staden railway in the Wijdendrift sector, facing the enemy's position on the south-west margin of the Houthulst Forest. The troops thus relieved were in a very exhausted condition after a long tour of duty on a front that was mostly made up of posts in badly-cratered and waterlogged ground with little shelter of any kind. The 51st Brigade held the line here for a few days. They were then relieved and returned to Corps Reserve in the Proven area. Here on November 7th they rejoined the remainder of the 17th Division, which on that day entrained at Recques for Proven and Elverdinghe to take over again the front it had held in October.
The Division held the sector for a month, under an accentuated form of the " awful conditions " of October. Hard frost and dry weather would have meant more cold, but it would have been tolerable and would have made life comparatively easy. But instead of changing weather, with snaps of early winter frost, there were days and nights of almost ceaseless cold rain. The troops were living and moving in a morass under frequent bursts of gunfire, with intermittent and poisonous experiences of the horrible new mustard gas shells, and bombing raids of enemy aircraft. lt was no longer trench warfare, but mud-hole warfare. After the capture of Passchendaele on November 9th any idea of a further advance even on the Ridge had been abandoned. But the menace of an advance was maintained, and the enemy was still anxious about his Flanders front. A change of weather might make renewed operations possible, so the Germans still kept a huge army massed on our front. In November, prisoners taken by patrols and deserters confirmed the information obtained by our Intelligence Department that the enemy, with his hands freed in Eastern Europe by the Russian collapse, was moving several Divisions westward. Some of these reinforcements reached Flanders. In the last week of October German troops had reinforced the Austrians on the Alpine front and our Italian Allies had suffered the disaster of Caporetto. Their armies were being hustled back across the Venetian plain and soon British and French divisions were being hurried to Italy to avert a catastrophe. Thus, as the Flanders offensive came to a dead stop in the mud, there were omens of the tremendous crisis of the new year. At the end of November there came rumours that the enemy was preparing a withdrawal in Flanders, like the retirement of the Hindenburg line after the longdrawn battle of the Somme. On November 29th the Staff Diary of the Division recorded that: " In view of an intercepted German wireless 'Dismantling wireless' all concerned were informed of a probable enemy withdrawal." Orders were issued for keeping close watch for the first stage of the expected move and for following it up. But nothing happened, and the message intercepted probably referred only to the shifting of some local wireless post in the hostile line. Apart from this disappointed hope the month in the sector was a time of dreary routine and patient endurance. The three Brigades took their turn in reserve, support and front line The probable outlook was that of tours of duty in the line with alternate short periods of rest behind it all through the winter. But in the first week of December there came a welcome and unexpected move from Flanders. In the late hours of the evening on December 5th, the 35th Division completed the relief of the 17th in the sector. The Division concentrated west of the Yser line and began to move by train to Recques area near St.Omer.
Bron: History of the 17th Northern Division; door Atteridge A.
